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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 Nos. 09-3623 & 10-4310 
 ___________ 
 
 ALPHA MOHAMMED JALLOH, 




 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                     Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A98 244 116) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Mirlande Tadal 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 4, 2011 
 
 Before:  RENDELL JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 







On March 18, 2009, Alpha M. Jalloh, a citizen of Guinea, arrived in the United 
States without a visa, a valid passport, or any form of identification.  The Department of 
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Homeland Security charged him with removability pursuant to Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”) §§ 212(a)(6)(C)(i) & 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) [8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) & 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)].  Jalloh conceded the charges and 
subsequently applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).   
Jalloh appeared before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and testified that his father 
was a member of the Guinean military and that he grew up in a military camp.  After his 
father died, Jalloh took up residence with another man in the camp, identified as 
“Lieutenant Barry.”  Lieutenant Barry put Jalloh in charge of household duties.  
According to Jalloh, when he did not perform those duties adequately, Lieutenant Barry 
would physically abuse him.  The incident which sparked Jalloh‟s departure, however, 
occurred when he observed members of the military mistreating individuals associated 
with the prior regime.  Upon witnessing the abuse, Jalloh made a disparaging comment 
about Lieutenant Barry and the military, without realizing that Lieutenant Barry was 
within earshot.  When he discovered that Lieutenant Barry had heard the comment, Jalloh 
fled the camp.  A friend told Jalloh that the military was searching for him.  Jalloh went 
to another town, took up residence with a friend, and eventually fled to Holland using a 
fraudulent passport.  After a month in Holland, Jalloh traveled to the United States. 
The IJ, assuming that Jalloh‟s testimony was credible, found that he did not 
demonstrate that he had suffered past persecution or that he had a well-founded fear of 
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future persecution on account of a protected ground.  Jalloh appealed to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  The BIA agreed that there was not a sufficient nexus 
between the physical mistreatment that Jalloh suffered and a statutorily protected ground, 
and that Jalloh‟s comment concerning the mistreatment of members of the prior regime 
was not sufficient to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution.  The Board also 
agreed that Jalloh did not qualify for protection under the CAT.  Jalloh filed a timely 
petition for review.  (C.A. No. 09-3623).   
While that petition was pending, Jalloh filed a motion to reopen and reconsider 
with the BIA.  Jalloh relied on an affidavit from a friend indicating that the Guinean 
military is searching for him, several news articles, and the 2009 State Department 
County Report on Human Rights Practices for Guinea.  The BIA denied the motions, 
holding that they were untimely.  To the extent that Jalloh sought reconsideration, the 
BIA held that he had not identified an error of fact or law in the prior decision what 
would alter the outcome.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b).  The Board further concluded that 
Jalloh‟s evidence was insufficient to establish a change in country conditions so as to 
create an exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(c)(3).  According to the BIA, Jalloh failed to demonstrate that the information 
in his friend‟s affidavit was not available and could not have been discovered or 
presented at the previous hearing.  Id.  Regardless of whether country conditions had 
changed, however, the BIA held that Jalloh had not presented a prima facie case that he is 
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eligible for relief.  Jalloh filed a second petition for review.  (C.A. No. 10-4310).  The 
Clerk consolidated the petitions for disposition. 
We have jurisdiction under INA § 242 [8 U.S.C. § 1252].  To qualify for asylum, 
Jalloh must show either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.  INA § 101(a)(42)(A) [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) ].  An alien‟s failure to 
demonstrate eligibility for asylum necessarily means that he failed to meet the higher 
burden of proof for statutory withholding of removal.  See Mudric v. Att‟y Gen., 469 
F.3d 94, 102 n. 8 (3d Cir.2006).  For relief under the CAT, Jalloh must demonstrate that 
it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to Guinea.  See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.16(c)(2); see also Pierre v. Att‟y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 186, 189 (3d Cir. 2008) (en 
banc).  
Because the BIA‟s original final order of removal both adopted the findings of the 
IJ and discussed some of the bases for the IJ‟s decision, we review the decisions of both 
the IJ and the BIA.  Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).  Our review of 
these decisions is for substantial evidence, considering whether they are “supported by 
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.”  
Lin-Zheng v. Att‟y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal citation 
omitted).  We review the denial of the motion to reopen and reconsider for abuse of 
discretion.  See Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005).  Under this 
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standard, we may reverse the BIA‟s decision only if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary 
to law.”  Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004). 
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the BIA‟s holding that Jalloh is 
ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal.  Jalloh emphasizes that he was “treated 
as a slave” by a “government official” while on a “governmental army base.”  
Importantly, however, there is no evidence that the abuse occurred on account of a 
protected ground.  Ndayshimiye v. Att‟y Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A] 
key task for any asylum applicant is to show a sufficient „nexus‟ between persecution and 
one of the listed protected grounds.”).  Indeed, the record confirms that the abuse, while 
severe, was a result of Lieutenant Barry‟s displeasure with Jalloh‟s performance of 
domestic chores.  See Klawitter v. INS, 970 F.2d 149, 152 (6
th
 Cir. 1992) (“However 
distasteful his apparent treatment of the respondent may have been, such harm or threats 
arising from a personal dispute of this nature, even one taking place with an individual in 
a high governmental position, is not a ground for asylum.”).  For example, in his asylum 
statement, Jalloh indicated that “Lieutenant Barry took me to assist him in pressing his 
clothing, shining his shoes[,] and doing whatever he needed.  One day I was late and as 
punishment he tied my hands and feet together and left me that way for the entire night.”  
Furthermore, Jalloh responded in the affirmative when asked on cross-examination, “The 
times that Lieutenant Barry beat you was because he was not satisfied with how you were 
taking care of his clothing or uniforms, that kind of thing?”  Thus, because the harm that 
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Jalloh suffered arose solely from a personal dispute, we must affirm the conclusion that 
he did not suffer past persecution.  Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 727 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(holding that “retaliation in response to a personal dispute” does not constitute 
persecution). 
Further, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Jalloh failed to establish 
a well-founded fear of future persecution.  To demonstrate that he has a well-founded 
fear of persecution, an applicant must satisfy three requirements:  (1) he or she has a fear 
of persecution in his or her native country; (2) there is a reasonable likelihood that he or 
she will be persecuted upon return to that country; and (3) the applicant is unable or 
unwilling to return to that country as a result of his or her fear.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.13(b)(2)(i).  Jalloh claimed that he made a disparaging comment about Lieutenant 
Barry and the military, that Lieutenant Barry overheard the comment, and that the 
military briefly searched for him after he ran away from the military camp.  We conclude 
that, under these circumstances, Jalloh‟s fear that he will be harmed upon return to 
Guinea is not reasonable.  Notably, Jalloh presented no significant evidence that the 
Guinean military has a continuing inclination to persecute him for a single statement 
criticizing the treatment of individuals associated with the previous government.  As 
noted, because Jalloh failed to establish eligibility for asylum, he necessarily failed to 
meet the more stringent showing required to qualify for withholding of removal.  Mudric, 
469 F.3d at 102 n.8.  In addition, the BIA properly denied Jalloh‟s CAT claim because 
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the record evidence does not compel the conclusion that he is “more likely than not” to be 
tortured if returned to Guinea.  Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 Finally, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Jalloh‟s 
motion to reopen and reconsider.  Jalloh does not challenge the BIA‟s conclusion that his 
motions were untimely.  8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(b)(2); 1003.2(c)(2).  The time and number 
requirements do not apply, however to motions to reopen that rely on evidence of 
“changed country conditions,” INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)], or 
“changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is 
material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the 
previous hearing.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).  We find no merit in Jalloh‟s efforts to 
establish changed county conditions so as to excuse his time-barred motion to reopen.  
Indeed, as the Board properly found, the evidence submitted with Jalloh‟s motion to 
reopen “describe[d] a continuance of the on-going alleged threat from [Lieutenant] Barry 
and . . . the military that gave rise to [Jalloh‟s] first claim.”  Notably, when Jalloh 
appeared before the IJ in June 2009, the military regime which allegedly seeks to 
persecute him had already seized power in a coup.  See Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 
252 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that the term “previous hearing” in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) refers 
to the proceedings before the IJ).  Moreover, Jalloh failed to sufficiently explain why he 
could not have discovered or presented at the previous hearing an affidavit indicating that 
police and soldiers are continuing to look for him.  Finally, we agree that increased 
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violence against political opponents in Guinea, as evidenced by news articles describing 
atrocities committed by government forces at a political rally in September 2009, does 
not establish Jalloh‟s prima facie eligibility for relief, especially where Jalloh has not 
identified himself as a member of an opposition party.    




                                                 
1
 Jalloh‟s Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Appendix and to Expand the 
Record is denied because the documents he seeks to have considered are part of the 
record in C.A. No. 10-4310. 
